Steganography is the problem of hiding secret messages in "innocent-looking" public communication so that the presence of the secret messages cannot be detected. This paper introduces a cryptographic formalization of steganographic security in terms of computational indistinguishability from a channel, an indexed family of probability distributions on cover messages. We use cryptographic and complexity-theoretic proof techniques to show that the existence of one-way functions and the ability to sample from the channel are necessary conditions for secure steganography. We then construct a steganographic protocol, based on rejection sampling from the channel, that is provably secure and has nearly optimal bandwidth under these conditions. This is the first known example of a general provably secure steganographic protocol. We also give the first formalization of "robust" steganography, where an adversary attempts to remove any hidden messages without unduly disrupting the cover channel. We give a necessary condition on the amount of disruption the adversary is allowed in terms of a worst case measure of mutual information. We give a construction that is provably secure and computationally efficient and has nearly optimal bandwidth, assuming repeatable access to the channel distribution.
INTRODUCTION
A classic problem of computer security is the mitigation of covert channels. First introduced by Lampson [1] , a covert channel in a (single-host or distributed) computer system can be roughly defined as any means by which two processes or users can exchange information in violation of security policy. While the exact detection of usable covert channels in a system is undecidable, many conservative approaches exist to detect and eliminate all potential covert channels; for example, the US Department of Defense "Light Pink Book" [2] on covert channel analysis includes detailed procedures to find and eliminate covert channels. Unfortunately, the cost of such elimination is often prohibitive; in this case, the Light Pink Book recommends techniques to limit the bandwidth of covert channels and requires auditing to detect any use of the covert channel. A natural question that arises from this suggestion is whether it is feasible for an auditor to do so. This paper focuses on the dual problem of steganography: How can two communicating entities send secret messages over a public or audited channel so that a third party such as the reference monitor cannot detect the presence of the secret messages? Notice how the goal of steganography is different from classical encryption, which seeks to conceal the content of secret messages: Steganography is about hiding the very existence of the secret messages.
Steganographic "protocols" have a long and intriguing history that predates covert channels, stretching back to antiquity. For example, Kahn [3] relates stories of World War II prisoners, spies, and soldiers sending secret messages-written in invisible ink, hidden in love letters (e.g., hiding the message in the first character of each sentence), or using other "physical" steganographic techniques-to circumvent inspections by both the Allied and Axis governments. In response, postal censors crossed out anything that looked like sensitive information (e.g., long strings of digits) and they prosecuted individuals whose mail seemed suspicious. In many cases, censors even randomly deleted innocent-looking sentences or entire paragraphs in order to prevent secret messages from being delivered.
More recently, there has been a great deal of interest in digital steganography, that is, in hiding secret messages in communications between computers. This interest is apparently fueled by the increased amount of communication that is mediated by computers and by connections to potential commercial applications: Hidden information could potentially be used to detect or limit the unauthorized propagation of the innocent-looking "carrier" data. Because of this, there have been numerous proposals for protocols to hide data in channels containing pictures [4] , [5] , video [5] , [6] , [7] , audio [8] , [9] , and even typeset text [10] . Many of these protocols are extremely clever and rely heavily on domain-specific properties of these channels. On the other hand, the literature on steganography also contains many clever attacks that detect the use of such protocols. As a result, it is unclear from this body of work whether secure steganography is possible at all.
In this paper, we use techniques from cryptography and complexity theory to answer the question "under what conditions is (secure) steganography possible?" We give cryptographic definitions for symmetric-key stegosystems and steganographic secrecy against a passive adversary in terms of indistinguishability from a probabilistic channel process. We show that a widely believed complexitytheoretic assumption (the existence of a one-way function) and access to a channel oracle are both necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of secure steganography relative to any channel. We furthermore give a construction that has essentially optimal bandwidth when compared with known provably secure constructions. Finally, we consider the question of robust steganography that resists attempts to censor the use of a covert channel; we prove necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a secure robust stegosystem and give a provably robust stegosystem with nearly optimal bandwidth under attack.
Previous Work
The scientific study of steganography in the open literature began in 1983 when Simmons [11] stated the problem in terms of communication in a prison. In his formulation, two inmates, Alice and Bob, are trying to hatch an escape plan. The only way they can communicate with each other is through a public channel, which is carefully monitored by the warden of the prison, Ward. If Ward detects any encrypted messages or codes, he will throw both Alice and Bob into solitary confinement. The problem of steganography is then: How can Alice and Bob cook up an escape plan by communicating over the public channel in such a way that Ward does not suspect that anything "unusual" is going on?
Anderson and Petitcolas [12] , [13] posed many of the open problems resolved in this article. In particular, they pointed out that it was unclear how to prove the security of a steganographic protocol and gave an example that is similar to the protocol we present in Section 4 but noted that it was not clear what properties were necessary to prove its security. They also posed the open question of bounding the bandwidth that can be securely achieved over a given cover channel.
Since then, several works [14] , [15] , [16] , [17] have addressed information-theoretic definitions of steganography. Cachin [14] , [18] defines security by requiring that the relative entropy between stegotexts, which encode hidden information, and independent identically distributed samples from some innocent-looking covertext probability distribution, is small. He also gives a construction that is provably secure but relies critically on the assumption that all orderings of covertexts are equally likely. Cachin points out several flaws in other published information-theoretic formulations of steganography. In addition to requiring arbitrarily long shared secrets, all of these works assume a more restrictive model of innocent communication and do not address bandwidth, robustness, or the necessary conditions for steganography.
Subsequent to the announcements of our results [19] , [20] , several extensions have been investigated. Reyzin and Russell [21] were the first to show that construction 1 (see Fig. 1 ) could be securely extended to multiple-bit hiddentexts for high-entropy channels, but their construction is still less efficient than construction 2 (see Fig. 2 ) in terms of bits per symbol. Independent of our bandwidth upper and lower bounds, Dedi c et al. [22] proved the security of a stegosystem similar to our construction 2 and gave an upper bound on the bandwidth per query of a universal stegosystem. Their bound is weaker than ours (in terms of bits per oracle query) by a factor of log 2 2e but applies to a more general class of stegosystems and is proved using techniques of independent interest. Van Le and Kurosawa [23] proposed a stegosystem based on arithmetic coding that uses specialized knowledge of a channel to achieve higher bandwidth per symbol in some cases. Lysyanskaya and Meyerovich [24] considered the effects of an imperfect channel sampling procedure on universal stegosystems. Backes and Cachin [25] introduced a notion of "active attacks" that use a decoding oracle to detect the presence of hidden messages in a special "challenge" cover message.
Preliminaries
We denote the length of a string or sequence s by jsj. We denote the empty string or sequence by " and the concatenation of strings s 1 and s 2 by s 1 ks 2 . We assume the use of efficient and unambiguous pairing and unpairing operators on strings so that ðs 1 ; s 2 Þ may be uniquely interpreted as the pairing of s 1 with s 2 and may not be the same as s 1 ks 2 . One example of such an operation is to encode ðs 1 ; s 2 Þ by a prefix-free encoding of js 1 j, followed by s 1 , followed by a prefix-free encoding of js 2 j, and then s 2 . Unpairing works in the obvious way.
We let U k denote the uniform distribution on f0; 1g k . If X is a finite set, we denote by x X the action of uniformly choosing x from X. We denote by F L;l the uniform distribution on functions f : f0; 1g L ! f0; 1g l . For a probability distribution D, we denote the support of D by ½D. For an integer n, we let ½n denote the set f1; 2; . . . ; ng.
We make use of two different measures of the information in a probability distribution. Let D be a probability distribution with finite support D; then, the Shannon Entropy of D is H S ðDÞ ¼ À P d2D Pr D ½d log 2 Pr D ½d, and the Minimum Entropy of D is H 1 ðDÞ ¼ min d2D fÀlog 2 Pr D ½dg.
We model all parties by Probabilistic Turing Machines (PTMs). A PTM is a standard Turing machine with an additional read-only "randomness" tape that is initially set so that every cell is a uniformly independently chosen bit. If A is a PTM, we denote by x AðyÞ the event that x is drawn from the probability distribution defined by A's output on input y for a uniformly chosen random tape. We write A r ðyÞ to denote the output of A with random tape fixed to r on input y.
We sometimes use Oracle PTMs (OPTMs). An OPTM is a PTM with two additional tapes, a "query" tape and a "response" tape, and two corresponding states Q query and Q response . An OPTM runs with respect to some oracle O and when it enters state Q query with value y on its query tape, it goes in one step to state Q response , with x OðyÞ written to its "response" tape. If O is a probabilistic oracle, then A O ðyÞ is a probability distribution on outputs taken over both the random tape of A and the probability distribution on O's responses.
Let F : f0; 1g k Â f0; 1g L ! f0; 1g l denote a family of functions. Informally, F is a pseudorandom function (PRF) family if F and F L;l are indistinguishable by oracle queries. Formally, let A be an oracle probabilistic adversary. Define the PRF advantage of A over F as
Define the insecurity of F as InSec prf F ðt; q; kÞ ¼ max A2Aðt;qÞ fAdv prf A;F ðkÞg, where Aðt; qÞ denotes the set of adversaries taking at most t steps and making at most q oracle queries. Then, F k is a ðt; q; Þ-PRF if InSec prf F ðt; q; kÞ . Suppose that lðkÞ and LðkÞ are polynomials. A sequence fF k g k2IN of families F k : f0; 1g k Â f0; 1g LðkÞ ! f0; 1g lðkÞ is called pseudorandom if, for all polynomially bounded adversaries A, Adv prf A;F ðkÞ is negligible in k. We will sometimes write F k ðK; ÁÞ as F K ðÁÞ. We note that the results of [26] and [27] , when taken together, imply that the existence of PRFs and one-way functions are equivalent.
CHANNELS
We seek to define steganography in terms of indistinguishability from a "usual" or innocent-looking pattern of communication. In order to do so, we must characterize this pattern. We begin by supposing that Alice and Bob communicate via documents.
Definition 1 (documents). Let D be an efficiently recognizable
prefix-free set of strings or documents.
As an example, if Alice and Bob are communicating over a computer network, they might run the TCP/IP protocol, in which case they communicate by sending "packets" according to a format that specifies fields like a source and destination address, packet length, and sequence number.
Once we have specified what kinds of strings Alice and Bob send to each other, we also need to specify the probability that Ward will assign to each document. The simplest notion might be to model the innocent communications between Alice and Bob by a stationary distribution: Each time Alice communicates with Bob, she makes an independent draw from a probability distribution C and sends it to Bob. Notice that, in this model, all orderings of the messages output by Alice are equally likely. This does not match well with our intuition about real-world communications; if we continue the TCP/IP analogy, we notice, for example, that, in an ordered list of packets sent from Alice to Bob, each packet should have a sequence number that is one greater than the previous; Ward would become very suspicious if Alice sent only packets with odd sequence numbers.
Thus, we will use a notion of a channel that models a prior distribution on the entire sequence of communication from one party to another: Definition 2. A channel is a probability distribution on sequences s 2 D 1 .
Any particular sequence in the support of a channel describes one possible outcome of all communications from Alice to Bob-the list of all packets that Alice's computer sends to Bob's. The process of drawing from the channel, which results in a sequence of documents, is equivalent to a process that repeatedly draws a single "next" document from a distribution consistent with the history of already drawn documents-for example, drawing only packets that have a sequence number that is one greater than the sequence number of the previous packet. Therefore, we can think of communication as a series of these partial draws from the channel distribution, conditioned on what has been drawn so far. Notice that this notion of a channel is more general than the typical setting in which every symbol is drawn independently according to some fixed distribution: Our channel explicitly models the dependence between symbols common in typical real-world communications.
Let C be a channel. For a finite sequence h 2 D Ã , we let Pr C ½h ¼ P s2D 1 Pr C ½ðh; sÞ. We let C h denote the marginal channel distribution on a single document from D conditioned on the history h of already drawn documents; we let C l h denote the marginal distribution on sequences of l documents conditioned on h. Concretely, for any d 2 D, we will say that
and that, for anyd 2 d l ,
When we write "sample x C h , " we mean that a single document should be returned according to the distribution conditioned on h.
Informativeness. We will require that a channel satisfy a minimum entropy constraint for all histories. Specifically, we require that there exist constants L > 0, > 0, and > 0 such that, for all h 2 S l L D l , either Pr C ½h ¼ 0 or H 1 ðC h Þ ! . If a channel does not satisfy this property, then it is possible for Alice to drive the information content of her communications to 0, so this is a reasonable requirement. We say that a channel satisfying this condition is ðL; ; Þ-informative and, if a channel is ðL; ; Þ-informative for all L > 0, we say that it is ð; Þ-always informative, or simply always informative. Note that this definition implies an additive-like property of minimum entropy for marginal distributions; specifically, H 1 ðC l h Þ ! l. For ease of exposition, we will assume that channels are always informative in the remainder of this paper; however, our theorems easily extend to situations in which a channel is L-informative. The only complication in this situation is that there will be a bound in terms of ðL; ; Þ on the number of bits of secret message that can be hidden before the channel runs out of information.
Intuitively, L-informativeness requires that Alice always sends at least L packets over her TCP/IP connection to Bob, and at least one out of every packets she sends has some probable alternative. Thus, we are requiring that Alice always says at least L= "interesting things" to Bob.
Channel access. To demonstrate that it is feasible to construct secure protocols for steganography, we will assume only that Alice has oracle access to the marginal channel distributions C h on her communications to Bob. This is reasonable because, if Alice can communicate innocently with Bob at all, she must be able to draw from this distribution; thus, we are only requiring that, when using steganography, Alice can "pretend" she is communicating innocently. In fact, we will show in Section 5 that this requirement is necessary: If Alice can communicate steganographically with Bob, then she can draw samples from her marginal channel distributions.
On the other hand, we will assume that the adversary, Ward, knows as much as possible about the distribution on innocent communications. Thus, he will be allowed oracle access to marginal channel distributions C h for every history h and, in addition, the adversary may be allowed access to an oracle that on input ðh 2 D Ã ; lÞ returns an l-bit representation of Pr C ½h. Note that this allows Ward to compute the marginal probabilities of individual documents under arbitrary histories.
These assumptions allow the adversary to learn as much as possible about the channel distribution but do not require any legitimate participant to know the distribution on communications from any other participant. We will, however, assume that both Alice and Bob know the history of communications from Alice to Bob.
We will also assume that cryptographic primitives remain secure with respect to oracles that draw from the marginal channel distributions C h . Thus, channels that can be used to solve the hard problems that standard primitives are based on must be ruled out. In practice, this is of little concern, since the existence of such channels would have previously led to the conclusion that the primitive in question was insecure.
Notice that the set of documents need not be literally interpreted as a set of bitstrings to be sent over a network. In general, documents could encode any kind of information, including things like actions (such as accessing a hard drive or changing the color of a pixel) and times (such as pausing an extra 1 2 second between words of a speech). Our model is thus general enough to deal with these situations without any special treatment.
DEFINITIONS
We will first define a stegosystem in terms of syntax and correctness and then proceed to a security definition.
Definition 3 (stegosystem).
A stegosystem S for message space M, with security parameter k is a pair of probabilistic algorithms:
. S.Encode (abbreviated SE) takes as input a key K 2 f0; 1g k , a string m 2 M (the hiddentext), and a message history h. SEðK; m; hÞ returns a sequence of documents ðs 1 ; s 2 ; . . . ; s l Þ (the stegotext). . S.Decode (abbreviated SD) takes as input a key K, a sequence of documents ðs 1 ; s 2 ; . . . ; s l Þ, and a message history h. SDðK; s; hÞ returns a hiddentext m 2 M. Both algorithms may be stateful, in which case they have an implicit fourth parameter, the current state.
Correctness
Of course, in order for a stegosystem to be useful, it must be correct: When using the same key, history, and state (if any), decoding should usually recover the encoded message.
Definition 4 (correctness).
A stegosystem S is correct if, for every message m 2 M and every history h 2 D Ã , the "error function"
where the probability is taken over the key K and any coin tosses of SE and SD.
Security
Intuitively, what we would like to require is that no efficient warden can distinguish between stegotexts output by SE and covertexts drawn from the channel distribution C h . As we stated in Section 2, we will assume that W knows the distribution C h ; we will also allow W to know the algorithms involved in S, as well as the history h of Alice's communications to Bob. In addition, we will allow W to pick the hiddentexts that Alice will hide if she is in fact producing stegotexts. Thus, W 's only uncertainty is about the key K and the single bit denoting whether Alice's outputs are stegotexts or covertexts.
As with encryption schemes, we will model an attack against a stegosystem as a game played by a passive warden, W , who is allowed to know the details of S and C.
Definition 5 (chosen hiddentext attack). In a chosen hiddentext attack with security parameter k, W is given access to a "mystery oracle" M, which is chosen from one of the following distributions:
1. ST . The oracle ST has a uniformly chosen key K U k and responds to queries ðm; hÞ with a StegoText drawn from SEðK; m; hÞ. 2. CT . The oracle CT has a uniformly chosen K as well and responds to queries ðm; hÞ with a CoverText c C ' h of length ' ¼ jSEðK; m; hÞj. If S is stateful, M's queries may include a state input to SE, with the restriction that W must be state respecting: It cannot cause the state of SE to repeat itself. We require staterespecting adversaries against stateful schemes to model the ability of the sender to maintain a state that does not repeat, which can be used to ensure that different invocations of the protocol are "independent" of each other.
After interacting with its oracle, W M ð1 k Þ outputs a bit, which represents its guess about the type of M. We define W 's advantage against a stegosystem S for channel C by
where the probability is taken over the randomness of ST , CT , and W . Define the insecurity of S with respect to channel C by where Wðt; q; lÞ denotes the set of all adversaries that make at most qðkÞ queries totaling at most lðkÞ bits (of hiddentext) and running in time at most tðkÞ.
Definition 6 (steganographic secrecy). A stegosystem S k is called ðt; q; l; Þ steganographically secret against a chosen hiddentext attack for the channel C (ðt; q; l; Þ-SS-CHA-C) if InSec ss S;C ðt; q; l; kÞ .
CONSTRUCTIONS
For our feasibility results, we have taken the approach of assuming a channel that can be drawn from freely by the stegosystem; this is in contrast to many ad hoc proposals in the literature, where the stegosystem is given only a single sample from the channel as input. We prove in Section 5 that our notion of steganographic secrecy requires the ability to draw multiple samples from the channel. Thus, removing this requirement would require a fundamentally different notion of security than the one we give here. It is also worth noting that the stegosystem we construct that has relatively little knowledge of the channel distribution-SE-needs only to sample from an oracle according to the distribution. This is because in many cases the full distribution of the channel has never been characterized; for example, the oracle may be a human being or a video camera focused on some complex scene. In these cases, the cost of sampling from C h may be nontrivial. We therefore stress that, due to the possible expense of oracle queries, it is important to minimize their use. We also point out that our definitions do not rule out efficient constructions for channels where more is known about the distribution.
In practice, the oracle is also the weakest point of all of our constructions. We assume the existence of a perfect oracle: one that can perform independent draws, one that can be rewound, etc. This assumption can be justified in some cases but not in others. If the oracle is a human, the human may not be able to perform independent draws from the channel as is required by our constructions. A real-world warden would use this to his advantage. We therefore stress the following cautionary remark: Our security proofs only hold under the assumption that the channel oracle is perfect.
A Simple Construction
We start by describing a low-bandwidth stegosystem that transmits only single-bit messages. Here, we assume that Alice and Bob share a channel and let C denote the channel distribution. We write d C h to denote the action of sampling d from the marginal distribution C h (via oracle access). We let F K ðÁ; ÁÞ denote a PRF family indexed by k ¼ jKj key bits that maps documents to bits, i.e., F k : f0; 1g k Â f0; 1g Ã ! f0; 1g. We let Alice and Bob share a secret key K 2 f0; 1g k and also a synchronized d bit counter N (which need not be secret). The OneBit stegosystem shown in Fig. 1 allows Alice and Bob to encode and decode single bits sent via their shared channel.
The idea behind OneBit is simple. The encoding algorithm makes ' copies of the bit m. For the ith copy, the encoder attempts to find a document d such that
If the encoder fails, it draws a second d 0 C h and sends d 0 instead of d. The decoder recovers ' bits by applying F K to each document and outputs 1 if the majority of the bits are 1 and 0 otherwise. Intuitively, this works because we expect each s i to map to the bit m with probability about 3 4 and, so, the probability of a decoding failure should be negligible in '.
Then, for any d 2 D,
i are drawn independently from C hi and independent of f, we get 
By the previous lemma, when f F Ã;1 , A f perfectly simulates a CT oracle for W , so Pr 
Proof. Consider the two documents d i and d 0 i that SE draws in iteration i. It will be the case that fðN þ i;
and with probability 0 otherwise. The theorem applies for any i because the function fðN þ i; ÁÞ is independent of fðN þ j; ÁÞ for i 6 ¼ j.
t u Lemma 3. Suppose C is ð; Þ-always informative and f F Ã;1 . Then, we have
Proof. Because C is ð; Þ-informative, for any h and any sequence d 1 ; . . . ; d C h , there must be a j between 0 and À 1 such that H 1 ðC ðh;...;d j Þ Þ ! =. If this were not the case, then we would have h such that H 1 ðC h Þ < . Thus, for a string of length ' drawn from C ' h , there must be '= positions i that have H 1 ðC hi Þ ! =. In these positions, the collision probability is at most 2 À= . In the other positions, the collision probability is at most 1. Applying the previous lemma yields the result. t u For completeness, we also show in Fig. 1 the obvious extension of the stegosystem OneBit to multiple-bit hiddentexts. We assume the same setup as that used previously. The MultiBit stegosystem works by simply repeatedly invoking OneBit on the individual bits of the message m. It is straightforward to state and prove similar theorems about the security and correctness of MultiBit.
Increasing the Rate
The Multibit stegosystem is secure for any ðL; ; Þinformative channel, but it is inefficient in the sense that in order to yield a negligible error rate e À' , it must set ' ¼ !ðlog kÞ, so the number of documents used to encode an m-bit hiddentext is !ðm log kÞ, whereas the number of documents needed to ensure m bits of information in a covertext is m= ¼ OðmÞ. Fig. 2 gives a stegosystem, OneBlock, that can hide bits of hiddentext in l ¼ ð1 þ Þ documents of stegotext, for any > 0. We will prove that this stegosystem has error rate 2 À and takes an expected 2 samples from the channel; in the next section, we prove that no stegosystem of this type can simultaneously hide as many or more bits of hiddentext in l documents while taking fewer than 2 samples from the channel. We will assume for this construction that both Alice and Bob know the history h and a value l such that < ð1 À ÞH 1 ðC l h Þ. We let F : f0; 1g k Â f0; 1g Ã ! f0; 1g be a PRF and also assume that Alice and Bob share a key K 2 f0; 1g k .
The idea behind this construction is that, to encode message m 2 f0; 1g , we can search for a document s such that F K ðN; sÞ ¼ m; this will involve drawing about 2 samples s ð0Þ ; s ð1Þ ; . . . ; s ð2 Þ . The main problem we encounter in extending the proof of Lemma 1 to this case is the assertion that F K ðN; s ðiÞ Þ and F K ðN; s ðjÞ Þ are independent: This is only true if s ðiÞ 6 ¼ s ðjÞ . To ensure that the sequence of inputs to F K ðN; ÁÞ is distinct, we maintain a counter c½d, for each d 2 D, that records how many times d has been sampled and we include c½s ðjÞ as an argument to F K ðN; Á Á ÁÞ. When decoding, we assume that the value of the counter for the stegotext was 1; we prove that this is correct with high probability. Proof. We will show that when F K is replaced by a random function f:
We can use the same PRF adversary A from the proof of Theorem 2 to get an advantage of at least Adv prf A;F ðkÞ ! Err S;C;m;h ðkÞ À e À þ 2 ÀH 1 ðC l h Þ , which will give the desired bound.
Let C denote the event that OneBlock:Encode f ðmÞ outputs an s i with c½s i > 1. This happens when there is at least one j < i such that s j ¼ s i . Thus, by the union bound, we have Pr½C P j<i Pr½s j ¼ s i . Since, for each j, Pr½s j ¼ s i 2 ÀH1ðC l h Þ and since i < 2 , we get the following bound:
Let D denote the event that OneBlock:Encode f ðmÞ outputs s 2 . This happens when each of the previous 2 tests fðN; h; c½s i ; s i Þ ¼ m fails. Since each test involves a distinct point of f, each of these happens independently with probability 1 À 1=2 . Since the events are independent, we can bound Pr½D by
The only other condition under which OneBlock: Encode f ðmÞ outputs s i is if fðN; h; 1; s i Þ ¼ m; thus,
As in Theorem 2, the adversary A f picks m 2 f0; 1g and runs OneBlock:Encode f ðm; "; 0; lÞ to get a sequence s 2 D l . A f then outputs 1 if fðsÞ 6 ¼ m. Clearly, when A's oracle f F K , we have Pr½A F K ð1 k Þ ¼ 1 ¼ Err S;C;m;" ðkÞ and, when f is a randomly chosen function from f0; 1g Ã ! f0; 1g l , we have shown that Pr½A f ð1 k Þ ¼ 1 e À þ 2 ÀH1ðC l h Þ . It follows that A has the stated advantage and, thus, 
When f is a randomly chosen function and since W is state respecting, A never evaluates f on any point twice.
Thus, A f is equivalent to a process that draws a new independent function at each stage. In this model, for any d 2 D l , we have that Pr½SEðm; hÞ ¼ d ¼ Pr f;s C l h ½s ¼ djfðsÞ ¼ m and, since s and f are drawn independently, we have that Pr½SEðm;
Thus, A's responses to W 's queries are distributed according to C, so
Combining the cases yields
which proves the theorem. t u
We note that the error rate here is negligible in but polynomial in the expected runtime t ¼ 2 . The error rate can be made negligible in t by using standard errorcorrecting techniques such as a Reed-Solomon block code over GF ð2 Þ using block length 2 and minimum distance 42 ð1ÀÞ . This block code has rate 1 À oð1Þ in terms of t and standard tail bounds show that the probability of a decoding error will be negligible in t.
Optimality of OneBlock
We concern ourselves with the rate of a universal blockwise bounded-sample stegosystem. A universal stegosystem S accepts an oracle for the channel C and is secure against a chosen hiddentext attack with respect to C as long as C does not violate the hardness assumptions S is based on. Universality is important because, typically, there is no good description of the marginal distributions on a channel. A ðh; l; ; tÞ-sample-bounded blockwise stegosystem encodes messages in (multiples of) a fixed "block size" of bits, always outputs l-document sequences from the channel and draws at most t samples from C l h when encoding a block. Since we require a stegosystem to have bounded runtime and to be universal, the runtime of SEðK; m; hÞ is always an upper bound on t. Conversely, if a stegosystem is t-sample bounded but not t À 1-sample bounded, then t is a lower bound on the worst case runtime of SE.
We consider the class Sðh; l; ; tÞ of stegosystems that draw at most t samples from C l h to encode bits of hiddentext; we will show two upper bounds on the hiddentext length for any S 2 Sðh; l; ; tÞ. The first MAX t ðSÞ is in terms of the number of samples t. The second MAX C ðSÞ is in terms of the min entropy H 1 ðC l h Þ of the channel C. We define the combined upper bound by MAX C ðh; l; tÞ ¼ min MAX t ðSÞ; MAX C ðSÞ f g :
MAX t ðSÞ
For any stegosystem S 2 Sðh; l; ; tÞ, we will show that there exists a channel C such that S is insecure relative to C if À log t is any positive constant. Thus, it follows that MAX t ðSÞ log t.
Theorem 5. InSec ss S;C ðOðt þ kÞ; 1; ; kÞ ! 1 À 2 Àcðt;kÞ À 2 Àk À ðk; Þ, where ðk; Þ ¼ Pr m U;K;h ½SDðK; SEðK; m; hÞ; hÞ 6 ¼ m, and ! log t þ cðt; kÞ.
Proof. The channel C is defined as follows: to every history h of length k, we associate a polynomial of degree t þ 1 over GF ð2 k Þ with uniformly chosen coefficients, p h ðxÞ. To draw from C h , we draw x U k , compute y ¼ p h ðxÞ, and output xky. Notice that if S:SEðK; m; hÞ draws at most t samples ðx 1 ; y 1 Þ; . . . ; ðx t ; y t Þ C h and outputs a pair ðx 0 ; y 0 Þ such that x 0 6 2 fx 1 ; . . . ; x t g, then Pr½y 0 ¼ p h ðx 0 Þ 2 Àk . On the other hand, an adversary can draw t þ 1 samples from C h and compute p h by interpolation. Thus, when SEðK; m; hÞ outputs a pair ðx 0 ; y 0 Þ 6 2 fðx 1 ; y 1 Þ; . . . ; ðx t ; y t Þg, an adversary can distinguish between SEðm; hÞ and C h by checking whether y 0 ¼ p h ðx 0 Þ.
Formally, we define the adversary A O as follows: On input 1 k , sample a history h of length k by drawing h 1 C " and h i C h 1 ;...;h iÀ1 for 1 < i k. Clearly, A runs in time Oðt þ kÞ. We will now compute the advantage of A. First, notice that, given a covertext oracle, A will always output 0:
Now, let NS denote the event that SEðK; m; hÞ draws samples ðx 0 1 ; y 0 1 Þ; . . . ; ðx 0 t ; y 0 t Þ C h and outputs a stegotext ðx Ã ; y Ã Þ 6 2 fðx 0 1 ; y 0 1 Þ; . . . ; ðx 0 t ; y 0 t Þg. Since, in this case, Pr½y Ã ¼ p h ðx Ã Þ 2 Àk , we have that
Thus, we only need to give a lower bound on Pr½NS to complete the proof. Fix a tuple ðK; m; hÞ and consider the set SD À1 K;h ðmÞ ¼ fs 2 D : SDðK; s; hÞ ¼ mg. S i n c e ! log t þ cðt; kÞ, SD partitions D into t Â 2 cðt;kÞ such sets. Then, for any fixed set of samples ðx 0 i ; y 0 i Þ, the probability over m that SEðK; m; hÞ has a sample ðx 0 i ; y 0 i Þ 2 SD À1 K;h ðmÞ is at most qp , W outputs 1. Otherwise, W outputs 0. We will bound the probability that W outputs 1 given a stegotext oracle and a covertext oracle, respectively.
From the preceding paragraph, we know that, when W has a stegotext oracle, there exists an m Ã such that E½p m Ã 2 Àð'þÞ and we know that E½p ¼ 2 À' . So, W will only output 0 ifp is much smaller than expected (say,p < ffiffiffiffiffiffi þ1 2 q 2 À' , and call this event P) orp is about right andp m Ã is much larger than expected (say, p m Ã ! ffiffiffiffiffiffi þ1 2 qp , and call this event Q). Then, by Chernoff bounds, we have
We also know that, when W has a covertext oracle, it should be the case that for every m 2 f0; 1g Ã , E½p m ¼ 2 À' . Thus, W should only output 1 whenp is much larger than expected (say,p > ð1 þ 1 2 ð1 À ffiffiffiffiffiffi 2 þ1 q ÞÞ2 À' , and denote this event R) or somep m is much smaller than its expectation (say,p m < ffiffiffiffiffiffi þ1 2 qp , and denote this event S m ). Then, we have that
where the last three lines follow by the union bound and multiplicative Chernoff bounds. Combining these bounds with the constant c, we have Adv ss W;S;C ðkÞ ¼ Pr
The theorem follows by the definition of insecurity. t u
Removing Shared State
The previous constructions require Alice and Bob to keep a synchronized d-bit counter N; this is undesirable due to the fact that there may be no good way to resynchronize once a counter is corrupted. The NoState stegosystem shown in Fig. 2 shows how to convert any "stateful" stegosystem that requires only unique counter values (not necessarily consecutive ones) into a stateless stegosystem, at an expense of L documents. When L ¼ Oðk 1À Þ, this preserves the rate (near) optimality of the OneBlock stegosystem. The encoding and decoding functions of NoState are parameterized by the encoding and decoding functions of the underlying "stateful" stegosystem, and additionally share a secret key to a PRF family G k : f0; 1g k Â D L ! f0; 1g d . The NoState stegosystem works by choosing a long sequence from C L h and using it to derive a value N, which is then used as the state for the "stateful" stegosystem. This value is always a multiple of 2 d=2 so that, if the value derived from the long sequence never repeats, then any messages of length at most 2 d=2 will never use a value of N used by another message. 
To bound the first term, note that we can make an adversary X against ðSD; SEÞ that achieves this advantage by choosing a and running W. When W queries its oracle at ðm; hÞ, X draws S 1 C L h and computes N ¼ 2 d=2 G ðS 1 Þ. X will halt with output 0 in case of a repeated counter; otherwise, X O will return ðS 1 ; Oðm; ðh; S 1 Þ; NÞÞ to W .
To bound the probability of event C, we imagine that the game is played with a random function f F Ã;d=2 in place of G and let C f denote the event C in this scenario. Let S 1 ; . . . ; S q denote the L-document prefixes of the sequences returned by the oracle in the chosenhiddentext attack game and let N i ¼ fðS i Þ. Then, the event C f happens when there exist i 6 ¼ j such that N i ¼ N j or, equivalently, fðS i Þ ¼ fðS j Þ, and this event happens when S i ¼ S j or S i 6 ¼ S j^f ðS i Þ ¼ fðS j Þ. Thus, Pr f ½C f qðqÀ1Þ 2 ð2 ÀL= þ 2 Àd=2 Þ. Finally, observe that, for every W 2 Wðt; q; Þ, we can construct a PRF adversary A for G in Aðt þ '; qÞ such that Adv prf A;G ðkÞ ! j Pr½C À Pr½C f j. A runs W , using its oracle f in place of G to respond to W 's queries. A outputs 1 if the event C f occurs and 0 otherwise. Then, 
NECESSARY CONDITIONS
The previous section demonstrates that relative to an oracle for C, the existence of one-way functions is sufficient for the existence of secure steganography. In this section, we will explore weaker definitions of steganographic secrecy and establish two results. First, one-way functions are necessary for steganography; thus, relative to a channel oracle, the existence of one-way functions and secure steganography are equivalent. Second, we will show that in the "standard model, " without access to a channel oracle, the existence of a secure stegosystem implies the existence of a program that samples from C h and, thus, in the standard model, secure steganography for C exists if and only if (iff) C h is efficiently sampleable.
Steganography Implies One-Way Functions
To strengthen our result, we develop the weaker notion of security against known-hiddentext attacks (KHAs and say that S is secure against KHA with respect to D and C (SS-KHA-D-C) if, for every PPT W , for all polynomially bounded l and , Adv khaÀD W;S;C ðk; lðkÞ; ðkÞÞ is negligible in k. Thus, a stegosystem is secure against KHA if given the history h and a plaintext m, an adversary cannot distinguish (asymptotically) between a stegotext encoding m and a covertext of the appropriate length drawn from C h . We will show that one-way functions are necessary even for this much weaker notion of security. In order to do so, we will use the following results from [27] : Thus, a function is an FEG if its output is indistinguishable from a distribution with higher (Shannon) entropy. We make use of the following:
Theorem 8 [27, Lemma 4.16] . If there exists an FEG, then there exists a pseudorandom generator.
We note that the proof of Theorem 8 is "black box" with respect to the FEG, and thus, it holds relative to the presence of the channel oracle C.
Theorem 9. If there is a stegosystem S that is SS-KHA-D-C secure for some hiddentext distribution D and some channel C, then there exists a pseudorandom generator, relative to an oracle for C.
Proof. We will show how to construct a FEG from S.Encode, which, when combined with Proposition 8, will imply the result. We consider an experiment which draws a key K U k and hiddentext m D k 2 and define the random variable L ¼ jSEðK; m; "Þj. Because S is SS-KHA-D-C secure, we must have SEðK; m; "Þ; m ð Þ %C L " ; m À Á and, for any k, we must have one of the following cases:
1. H S ðC L " Þ > H S ðSEðK; m; "ÞÞ þ 1=k. In this case, the program that samples from C " is an FEG.
H S ðC L
" Þ < H S ðSEðK; m; "ÞÞ À 1=k. In this case, SE is an FEG. 3. jH S ðC L " Þ À H S ðSEðK; m; "ÞÞj 1=k. In the last case, we construct an FEG as follows: Let fðU k1 Þ draw m and K be as above and output ðSEðK; m; "Þ; mÞ, and let gðU k 2 Þ do the same and output ðC L " ; mÞ. Relative to an oracle for C, secure stegosystems exist iff one-way functions exist.
Sampleable Channels Are Necessary
We say that a channel C is efficiently sampleable if there exists an algorithm C such that for any polynomial time A, for any polynomial l,
is negligible in k. Notice that, for any efficiently sampleable channel C, the results of the previous sections prove that secure steganography with respect to C exists iff one-way functions exist in the standard model-e.g., without assuming oracle access to the channel C. Here, we will show that if secure steganography exists for C in the standard model, then C is efficiently sampleable.
Theorem 10. If there exists an efficiently sampleable D such that there is a SS-KHA-D-C secure stegosystem S in the standard model, then C is efficiently sampleable.
Proof. Consider the program C S with the following behavior: on input ð1 k ; hÞ, C S picks K f0; 1g k , picks m D, and returns the first document of S:EncodeðK; m; hÞ. Consider any PPT distinguisher A. We will show that the KHA adversary W that passes the first document of its input to A and outputs A's decision has at least the advantage of A. This is because, in case W 's input is drawn from SE, the input it passes to A is exactly distributed according to C S ð1 k ; hÞ and, when W 's input is drawn from C h , the input it passes to A is exactly distributed according to C h :
But, because S is SS-KHA-D-C secure, we know that W 's advantage must be negligible and, thus, no efficient A can distinguish this from the first document drawn from C jSEðK;D;hÞj h . So, the output of C S is computationally indistinguishable from C. t u
As a consequence of this theorem, if a designer is interested in developing a stegosystem for some channel C in the standard model, she can focus exclusively on designing an efficient sampling algorithm for C. If her stegosystem is secure, it will include one anyway and, if she can design one, she can "plug it in" to the constructions in Section 4 and get a secure stegosystem based on "standard" assumptions.
ROBUST STEGANOGRAPHY
Robust steganography can be thought of as a game between Alice and Ward in which Ward is allowed to make some alterations to Alice's messages. Ward wins if he can sometimes prevent Alice's hidden messages from being read, while Alice wins if she can pass a hidden message with high probability, even when Ward alters her public messages. For example, if Alice passes a single bit per document and Ward is unable to change the bit with probability at least 1 2 , Alice may be able to use error correcting codes to reliably transmit her message. It will be important to state the limitations we impose on Ward since, otherwise, he can replace all messages with a new (independent) draw from the channel distribution, effectively destroying any hidden information. In this section, we give a formal definition of robust steganography with respect to a limited adversary.
We will model the constraint on Ward's power by a relation R that is constrained to not corrupt the channel too much. That is, if Alice sends document d, Bob must receive a document d 0 such that ðd; d 0 Þ 2 R. This general notion of constraint is sufficient to include many simpler notions such as "only alter at most 10 percent of the bits"; however, it still significantly restricts Ward's ability to manipulate sequences of documents: In particular, they cannot be reordered or dropped. We will assume that it would be feasible for Alice and Bob to check (after the fact) if in fact, Ward has obeyed this constraint; thus, both Alice and Bob know the "rules" Ward must play by. Note, however, that Ward's strategy is still unknown to Alice and Bob.
Substitution-Robust Steganography
We model an R-bounded active warden W as an adversary that plays the following game against a stegosystem S:
1. W is given oracle access to the channel distribution C and to SEðK; Á; ÁÞ. W may access these oracles at any time throughout the game. 2. W presents an arbitrary message m Ã 2 f0; 1g l2 and history h Ã . 3. W is then given a sequence of documents ¼ Furthermore, if there is some document d 0 and history h for which P ðd;d 0 Þ2R Pr C h ½d ¼ 1, then, when h has transpired, Ward can effectively prevent the transfer of information from Alice to Bob by sending the document d 0 regardless of the document transmitted by Alice, because the probability that Alice picks a document related to d 0 is 1. That is, after history h, regardless of Alice's transmission d, Ward can replace it by d 0 , so seeing d 0 will give Bob no information about what Alice said.
Since we model the attacker as controlling the history h, then a necessary condition on R and C for robust communication is that 8h: Pr We denote by IðR; DÞ the function max y P ðx;yÞ2R Pr D ½x. We say that the pair ðR; DÞ is -admissible if IðR; DÞ and a pair ðR; CÞ is -admissible if 8h Pr C ½h ¼ 0 or IðR; C h Þ . Our necessary condition states that ðR; CÞ must be -admissible for some < 1.
It turns out that this condition (on R) will be sufficient, for an efficiently sampleable channel, for the existence of a stegosystem that is substitution robust against R.
Universally Substitution-Robust Stegosystem
In this section, we give a stegosystem that is substitution robust against any admissible bounding relation R, under a modified assumption on the channel and assuming that Alice and Bob know some efficiently computable -admissible relation R 0 such that R 0 is a superset of R. As with most of our constructions, this stegosystem is most likely impractical, but it serves as a proof that robust steganography is possible for any admissible relation.
Suppose that the channel distribution C is efficiently sampleable. (Recall that C is efficiently sampleable if there is an efficient algorithm C such that given a uniformly chosen string s 2 f0; 1g k , a security parameter 1 k , and history h, Cðh; 1 k ; sÞ is indistinguishable from C h .) We will assume that Alice, Bob, and Ward all have access to this algorithm. Note that this is a different assumption about the channel than what our previous constructions require: The channel is no longer a "black box," but rather, its results are repeatable across parties. Furthermore, we assume that Alice and Bob share a key K to a PRF family F : f0; 1g k Â f0; 1g Ã ! f0; 1g k and have a synchronized counter N. We will let nðkÞ ¼ !ðlog kÞ be a "robustness parameter." We begin with a stegosystem-ROneBit, shown in construction 3 (see Fig. 3 )-that robustly encodes a single bit.
The idea behind this construction is the following: Suppose that, instead of sharing a key to a PRF F , Alice and Bob shared two secret documents ð0Þ and ð1Þ drawn independently from C h . Then, Alice could send Bob the message bit m by sending document ðmÞ and Bob could recover m by checking to see if the document he received was related (by R 0 ) to ð0Þ or ð1Þ . Since the adversary is R bounded and ðD; R 0 Þ is -admissible, the probability of a decoding error-caused either by the adversary or by accidental draw of ð0Þ and ð1Þ -would be at most . Intuitively, ROneBit reduces the probability of a decoding error to n by encoding each hiddentext bit n times. Proof. Let W be a passive warden that runs in time t and makes at mostueries of total length at most q (each query can be only one bit, because of the type). We construct a PRF adversary A that runs in time t þ OðnqÞ and makes at most nq queries to F such that Adv prf A;F ðkÞ ¼ Adv ss W;ROneBit;C ðkÞ. The PRF adversary takes a function oracle f and emulates W ð1 k Þ, responding to the queries W makes to the encoder SE by using f in place of F K ðÁ; ÁÞ; A gives the same output as W .
Now, when f
On the other hand, when f is a uniformly chosen function, then A f is handing W stegotexts generated by calls to Cðh; 1 k ; ÁÞ with independent random values and, thus, they are distributed identically to samples from C h , so Pr½A f ð1 k 
Theorem 11. If F is pseudorandom, then ROneBit is substitution robust against R for C.
It is straightforward to extend ROneBit to a robust stegosystem that encodes multiple bits by encoding each of the bits individually. Another straightforward extension replaces single-bit arguments to the PRF with -bit arguments. In this case, the removal probability for an adversary is increased to 2 ' and the decoding time increases by a factor of Oð2 Þ.
Nearly Optimal Robust Steganography
It is not hard to see that the maximum rate of hiddentext per stegotext document attainable with the previous construction approaches log 1= and that in order to have negligible insecurity, the construction must have superpolynomial decoding time. We now show that this rate is essentially optimal: if a stegosystem is robust against any -admissible relation R (given access to R), then it can encode at most log 1= bits per document. We also demonstrate an efficient robust stegosystem that encodes ð1 À À oð1ÞÞ log 1= bits per document, for any constant > 0, showing that this upper bound is tight.
Upper Bound
Recall the definition of IðR; DÞ ¼ max y P ðx;yÞ2R Pr D ½x. We will show that any universal stegosystem for -admissible relations R (given access to R) that attempts to transmit more than À' log bits in ' documents is either not universally secret or not universally robust.
Theorem 12. Let S be a universal stegosystem that transmits more than ð1 þ Þ logð1=Þ bits per document. For every 0 < < 1, there exist a channel C and relation R such that , where c is a constant depending on .
Proof. We let C be the uniform distribution on n-bit strings, and Rðx; yÞ ¼ 1 iff the hamming distance of x and y is at most d, where d and n are constants chosen to make IðR; CÞ . We will give an attacker W that achieves the stated success probability. For notational convenience, we define l ¼ À' log . W picks the challenge hiddentext m Ã U l and gets in response the stegotext 2 S:SEðK; m Ã Þ. W then uniformly picks a sequence s Ã subject to j i À s Ã i j d for 1 i '. W 's output is the sequence s Ã . We now compute the success probability of W . Recall that Succ R W;S ðkÞ ¼ Pr½SDðK; s Ã Þ 6 ¼ m Ã , where this probability is taken over K, m Ã , s Ã , and . Notice that the adversary W is identical to a noisy discrete memoryless channel, with pðs Ã jÞ defined as the uniform distribution on fs 2 f0; 1g n : js À j dg. This channel has Shannon capacity exactly À log IðR; CÞ ¼ À log . Furthermore, any robust stegosystem is a candidate code for the channel. The strong converse to Shannon's coding theorem [28] tells us that any code with rate ð1 þ Þ log 1= will have an average error probability of at least 1 À 2 Àc ffi ffi ' p , where c ¼ 2 À4nþ2 logð1=Þ.
Since the event that the adversary W is successful is identical to the event that a decoding error occurs in the code induced by SEðK; ÁÞ; SDðK; ÁÞ, we have that
which satisfies the theorem. t u
Construction
In this section, we will give a secure universally -substitution-robust stegosystem that achieves rate ð1 À À oð1ÞÞ logð1=Þ for any > 0. We note that the construction mentioned at the end of Section 6.3, which encodes bits at a time by using a PRF with -bit arguments, can in principle achieve rate ð1 À Þ logð1=Þ by setting ¼ ð1 À Þ logð1=Þ'. Notice, however, that because the runtime of the decoding procedure in this case is exponential in ', the proof of robustness is not very strong: The information-theoretic bound on the success of W is essentially polynomial in the runtime of the PRF adversary we construct from W . We will now give a construction with a polynomial-time decoding algorithm, at the expense of a oð1Þ factor in the rate.
As before, we will assume that C is efficiently sampleable, that F : f0; 1g k Â f0; 1g Ã ! f0; 1g k is pseudorandom and both parties share a secret K 2 f0; 1g k , and a synchronized counter N. As before, we will let l ¼ ð1 À Þ' logð1=Þ, but we now set ' so that l ¼ log k. We set an additional parameter L ¼ k= logð1=Þ.
The idea behind this procedure is to break an nl-bit message into l-bit blocks, encode each one using the RLBit.Encode procedure, and then append the encoding of L documents of message-dependent redundancy. To decode, we iteratively attempt to match each stegotext block against each of the 2 l ¼ k possible hiddentext blocks; there will always be one matching block, and with some small probability k À , there will be an additional match. We perform a depth-first search on these matches to find a list L of candidate messages and then test each message to see whether the redundancy matches. Any candidate match from the depth-first search will also have matching redundancy with probability 2 Àk , and a union bound will thus bound the probability of a decoding failure by ð1 þ 1 Þ2 Àk . Furthermore, the total expected number of nodes explored by Decode is at most ð1 þ 1 Þn, so the reduction is efficient.
Theorem 13. RMBit (Fig. 4) is steganographically secret against a state-respecting chosen-hiddentext attack:
InSec ss RMBit;C ðt; q; l; kÞ InSec prf F t þ Oð'Þ; '; k ð Þ :
Proof. Let W be a passive warden that runs in time t and makes at mostueries of total length at most l (each query must be a multiple of l bits because of the input type). As in the previous proofs, we construct a PRF adversary A that runs in time t þ Oð'Þ and makes at most ' queries to F such that Adv prf A;F ðkÞ ¼ Adv ss W;RMBit;C ðkÞ:
The PRF adversary takes a function oracle f and emulates W ð1 k Þ, responding to the queries W makes to its oracle O by running RMBit.Encode, using f in place of F K ðÁ; ÁÞ. We see that, when f F K , A f perfectly emulates RMBit.Encode and, when f is a uniformly chosen function, the stegotexts passed to the adversary are samples from Cðh; ÁÞ with independent uniform inputs; by the assumption on C, these are identically distributed to samples from C ' h . Thus, A's advantage over F is exactly W 's advantage over RMBit.
The claim follows by the definition of insecurity. t u Theorem 14. RMBit is robust:
Fail R RMBit ðt; q; l; ln; kÞ InSec prf F ðt 0 ; q 0 ; kÞ þ ð1 þ 1=Þ2 Àk þ ðe=4Þ n ; w h e r e t 0 t þ Oððl þ ÞnÞ þ Oðð1 þ 1=ÞknÞ a n d q 0 2nð1 þ 1=Þ þ lð þ nÞ:
Proof. Let W be an active R-bounded ðt; q; l; lnÞ warden.
We construct a PRF adversary A that runs in time t 0 , makes at most 2nð1 þ 1=Þ þ lð þ nÞ PRF queries, and satisfies Adv prf A;F ðkÞ ! Succ R W;RMBit ðkÞ À ð1 þ 1=Þ2 Àk À ðe=4Þ n . A f works by emulating W , using its function oracle f in place of F K ðÁ; ÁÞ to emulate RMBit.Encode in responding to the queries of W . Let m Ã and s Ã be the hiddentext and the stegotext sequence returned by W , respectively. Then, A f returns 1 iff SD f ðs Ã ; h Ã Þ 6 ¼ m Ã . To ensure that the number of queries and runtime are at most t 0 and 2nð1 þ 1=Þ þ lð þ nÞ, we halt whenever SD f makes more than 2nð1 þ 1=Þ queries to f, an event we will denote by TB. We will show that Pr½TB ðe=4Þ n when f is a randomly chosen function. Thus, we can neglect this event in our case analyses. Now, when the oracle f is a uniformly chosen function, a decoding error happens when there exists another m 2 f0; 1g ln such that for all ði; jÞ, 1 i ', 1 j n, we have ðs ðjÀ1Þnþi ; LEnc f ðm 1...j Þ i Þ 2 R, and also, ðs 'nþi ; LEnc f ðmÞ i Þ 2 R for all i, 1 i L. Let j be the least j such that m j 6 ¼ m Ã j . Then, for blocks m jþ1 ; . . . ; m n , the '-document blocks LEnc f ðm 1...jþi Þ are independent of Ã jþi . Thus, for such m, the probability of a match is at most 'ðnÀjÞþL ¼ 2 Àk ðnÀjÞ' . Since there are 2 lðnÀjÞ messages matching m Ã in the first j blocks, we have that It remains to show that Pr½TB ðe=4Þ n . Notice that the expected number of queries to f by A is just the number of messages that match a j'-document prefix of s Ã , for 1 j n, times k. Let X m ¼ 1 if m 2 f0; 1g j' matches a j-block prefix of s Ã . Let X ¼ P n j¼1 P m2f0;1g j' X m denote the number of matching prefix messages. Then, n E½X nð1 þ 1=Þ, and a Chernoff bound gives us . For more information on this or any other computing topic, please visit our Digital Library at www.computer.org/publications/dlib.
